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PENNSYLVANIA GAS: TRUSTS, TAKINGS,
AND JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENTS
JOSHUA ULAN GALPERIN*
When I arrived at the house in Pittsburgh, John Fleenor was on the roof.
I had left Hartford, Connecticut by plane around 6:00 a.m. that morning,
touched down in Pittsburgh on schedule, rented a car in record time, and
made it to the house well before 9:00 a.m., which is when the home
inspection was scheduled to begin. Nevertheless, at least a quarter hour
early, John was on the roof and having a look around.
John was a younger man than I had expected. In my limited experience, I
had come to believe that home inspectors were contractors who had decided
knocking on walls and looking at electrical panels was a better job for an
aging handyman than the haul and grind of building and renovating. But
John scrambled down the ladder in no time, shook my hand, and told me
that the roof was in good shape.
My wife and I had both been offered new jobs at the University of
Pittsburgh, so we had travelled out over our winter break, looked at 18
homes, found the one we liked, made an offer, gotten an acceptance, and
here I was, less than a month later, for the home inspection.

* Josh Galperin is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law and the Special Advisor to the Environmental Law and Policy
Program at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. Before Joining the
faculty at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Professor Galperin was the Director of
the environmental Protection Clinic, Lecturer in Law, and a Research Scholar at Yale Law
School.
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After the roof, John looked at the main levels and then we made our way
down to the basement. “Hmm,” John hummed. “It looks like something is
happening down here.”
Indeed, the basement floor was bowing, peaking in the center of the
room, tapering down towards the utility closet in one direction and the
closet doors in the other direction. It didn’t look good. It was obvious that
we were not going to be setting up the room with a pool table, but was the
bulge a problem?
“I don’t think this is any problem,” John said with some confidence after
poking around a bit. “The house obviously had some movement after the
foundation was poured, but if it was still moving you’d see other problems.
The walls might be cracked, the windows might not open, and the stairs
would definitely be uneven.”
We had just been over all those things, windows, walls, stairs, and all
looked great.
John warned me though, “look, I’m not a structural engineer so I can’t
say for sure if you have a larger problem. Why don’t you call an engineer
and have them confirm this so you can rest assured.”
The very next day I was on the phone with Russell Kowalich. Russell is
a home inspector and a certified structural engineer. As it turned out,
Russell had been to my house before to look at the very same issue in the
basement. After a little negotiation, Russell disclosed his previous findings.
He assured me the bowing in the basement was a remnant and would not
cause any structural problems.
“A remnant of what?”
“Off-gassing from the shale beneath the house, which was probably
disturbed when they dug the foundation.”
Shale is a type of below-ground sedimentary rock that tends to have
fissures throughout its formation. In some shale, natural gas collects within
these breaks in such quantities that with modern drilling technologies,
businesses can economically extract that gas and make it available as a
source of energy. This is the geological basis of the so-called hydraulic
fracturing boom. In hydraulic fracturing, gas drillers will pump liquid into a
shale formation to break apart the shale and force the stored gas to the
surface. Apparently, when building a home it is possible to slightly disturb
shale that is close to the surface, which can release much smaller quantities
of gas. This, it turns out, is the sort of shale off-gassing that transformed the
basement of my new home.
Off-gassing from the shale beneath the foundation of my new home has
practically nothing to do with hydraulic fracturing, but possibly you could
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forgive an environmental law professor for immediately thinking about the
hydraulic fracturing boom, particularly around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
***
Our realtor pointed me to the State of Pennsylvania’s website because
the state wants to make sure that residents are aware of the risk of coal mine
subsidence. There is a website dedicated to this very issue, which warns:
“BE INFORMED Underground coal has been mined in Pennsylvania for
more than 200 years. It extends throughout 43 of our 67 counties….
CHECK FOR RISK Over one million homes in Pennsylvania sit on top of
abandoned mines.”1
The mine subsidence check is not so much a way to decide whether or
not to buy a home. It is a way to decide whether to buy subsidence
insurance. I cannot say what I would have done if our home were above an
abandoned mine, as many homes in Pittsburgh are, but I was awfully
relieved to learn that there had not been mining in our neighborhood. No
risk of subsidence for us. No need for insurance. And so we went through
with the sale of the house, where I sit as I type this sentence.
Hydraulic fracturing and coal mining, a century earlier, had much greater
effects on Pennsylvania’s development, and on the law, than they had on
my home-buying experience. But that both shale off-gassing and coal mine
subsidence popped up in important ways even before I had actually moved
to Pennsylvania prodded me to think more about both forms of energy
extraction.
As are many lawyers, I was aware of the historic case of Mahon v.
Pennsylvania Coal Company, which is about coal mine subsidence.2 The
case changed the way regulators and courts think about land restrictions.3 I
am also well aware that hydraulic fracturing is having an obvious impact in
Pennsylvania,4 and I recalled a conversation I had with a colleague in the

1. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, http://www.dep.pa.
gov/Citizens/MSI/Pages/default.aspx, (last visited Sept. 1 2018).
2. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Counsel, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 (1984).
4. E.g., Eliza Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/magazine/fracking-amwell-township.html;
Jennifer
Szalai, A Community Cracked Open by Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/books/review-amity-prosperity-fracking-elizagriswold.html.
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summer of 2017 about a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case related to
hydraulic fracturing.5
Eschewing grand ideas about some comprehensive theory of energy and
environmental law, or Pennsylvania’s special role in this area, I thought I
would explore something more modest. What, I pondered, could I learn
from a close reading of both cases, a look at the historical context of each,
and the way advocates and activists had received them? Perhaps nothing,
but who knows? In moving to Pennsylvania, in preparing to teach law
students here, it would not hurt to get to know two important cases a little
better. In doing that, in closely re-reading the cases and their contexts, and
in comparing them, I realized that they have very little in common. But they
can teach us something about judicial temperament and the important
distinction in law between analytical reasoning and policy outcomes.
***
Some 300 miles to the east of Pittsburgh, Scranton, Pennsylvania was the
one-time epicenter of anthracite coal mining.6 The high energy density of
anthracite, paired with its relatively clean burn made it a very valuable
commodity.7 Valuable enough, in fact, that coal companies thought it worth
the risk of extracting coal from beneath urban areas despite the fact that
hollowing out the land below buildings posed a risk to property and lives.8
Over two decades ago economics professor William Fischel investigated
the subsidence problem.9 He travelled to Scranton and surrounding areas
and discovered, to his own surprise, that while, thanks to subsidence “whole
houses [had been] swallowed up, and reports indicated that lives were
sometimes lost,”10 damage from subsidence he explained was, on the
whole, “episodic and limited; cities were not literally falling into the
earth.”11 The past, however, is not so different from the present. Then, as
now, high-profile problems could convert, in the public’s mind, a real but
limited threat into an intense and ever-present risk. What Fischel discovered
was that just before the start of the 1909 school year, an underground mine

5.
6.
(1995).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 16
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
See generally id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
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collapse had felled a Scranton schoolhouse.12 The event roused public fears
that eventually led to the famous case of Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal
Company.13
To help assuage the public concern over mine subsidence, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly passed the Kohler Act in 1921.14 The Act
required coal companies to leave a pillar of coal in place to support a
variety of different land uses including homes, schools, roads, commerce,
and industry.15 The Kohler Act only applied, however, when the owner of
the minerals, that is, the mining company, did not also own the surface
property.16
In the town of Pittston, just outside Scranton, H.J. Mahon owned a home
and the land on which that home sat.17 Below that land was coal owned by
the Pennsylvania Coal Company.18 In fact, Mahon had bought his land from
his father-in-law, an executive with the Company.19 In order to challenge
the validity of the Kohler Act, Mahon and the Company had strategized to
manufacture a conflict for the court.20 Mahon objected to Pennsylvania
Coal mining beneath his property because removal of the coal would, he
argued, cause his home to collapse.21
To the Pennsylvania Coal Company, the spring and summer of 1922
would have seemed a good time to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
deciding their case. Anthracite coal miners had gone on strike that spring,
making national news and straining the supply of coal.22 One might have
expected a court to consider the limited availability of coal and therefore
invalidate the Kohler Act, which may have further limited supply. But the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Act, reasoning that it validly
protects public safety.23
Just as the mining strikes were ending in September of 1922, the litigants
were heading to Washington, D.C. to argue their cause before the United
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id.
14. An act regulating the mining of anthracite coal; prescribing duties for certain
municipal officers; and imposing penalties, P.L. 1198 (May 27, 1921).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 494 (Pa. 1922).
18. Id.
19. FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 18.
20. Id.
21. Mahon, 118 A. at 494.
22. FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 25.
23. Mahon, 118 A. at 496.
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States Supreme Court.24 In December the Court issued its now famous
opinion in the case, holding that the Kohler Act went “too far.”25
Surprisingly, despite reaching the arguably conservative outcome that a
state regulation was invalid, the liberal Justice Holmes authored the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Mahon.26 Though his reasoning in the case is
famously unclear,27 what Holmes seemed to do in this case was apply a
substantive due process analysis. In his opinion, Holmes looked closely at
the Kohler Act and asked whether it advances the interests it purported to
protect: to wit, public safety.28 He determined that it did not.29 He likewise
balanced whatever public purpose did exist against the burden the Kohler
Act placed on Pennsylvania Coal’s mineral rights. Holmes determined that
the burden on the Company outweighed any public safety benefits because,
in this case, there was only a single home at risk.30
Mahon has become a foundation of what we today call regulatory
takings;31 the idea that if a regulation burdens property to a certain point, it
is not merely a regulation but is tantamount to an appropriation of private
property.32 This was a legal innovation, one that even Justice Scalia—who
could not have been more ideologically different from Justice Holmes—
was fond of quoting. And in many of those quotes, Scalia made a point of
mentioning Holmes by name.
“Justice Holmes recognized in Mahon…that if the protection against
physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully
enforced, the government’s power to redefine the range of interests
included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained….”

24. FISCHEL, supra note 6, at 25.
25. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (a Westlaw search on July 5, 2018
shows that the opinion has been cited over 8,500 times).
26. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.
27. E.g., William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the
Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 816, 830–31 (1998) (“Despite disagreement about
precisely how to read Justice Holmes’s opinion in Mahon….”); Joseph F. DiMento, Mining
the Archives of Pennsylvania Coal: Heaps of Constitutional Mischief, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 349,
397 (1990) (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 156
(1977) (“The Opinion is ‘both the most important and most mysterious writing in takings
law.’”)).
28. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 413–14.
31. Treanor, supra note 27, at 814–15, citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 US. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
32. Treanor, supra note 27, at 814 n.6.
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wrote Justice Scalia.33 “Prior to Justice Holmes’s exposition in [Mahon], it
was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a direct
appropriation of property….” Scalia also reminded his readers.34 Property
rights advocates have been equally sanguine about the continuing impacts
of Mahon, citing it, as the conservative Pacific Legal Foundation has, to
argue against land use regulations.35
Of course, at the very same time, Mahon has been a trouble spot for
regulators, environmentalists, and liberal scholars seeking to make a case
for more government flexibility or respect for values-based environmental
protection. Professor Joseph Sax, arguably the godfather of modern
environmental legal thought, wrote in 1971 that Mahon and the thinking
that underlies it was “naïve” for thinking that property can be easily defined
by only its economic values as Justice Holmes had supposed.36
Although I was reminded of the Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal case
because buying a home in Pittsburgh forced me to consider whether the
legacy of coal mining might swallow me whole, it’s hard to forget about a
case that has had such national significance. The hydraulic fracturing boom
over the past decade has likewise had national significance, but that stems
from the way hydraulic fracturing has transformed the American energy
landscape. Because almost all aspects of hydraulic fracturing are governed
at the state and local level,37 there is no nationwide legal revolution on the
horizon but there has been a revolution of sorts here in Pennsylvania.
***
In the summer of 1968, Franklin Kury read an article in the New York
Times about a proposed amendment to that state’s constitution.38 The
amendment dealt with what seemed like minutia of New York’s
environment and natural resources, but it gave Kury an idea.39 Then a
33. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
34. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
35. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation and California Farm Bureau
Federation In Support of Appellant County of Siskiyou at 24, Envtl. Law Found. v. State
Water Resource Bd., (Aug. 10, 2017) (No. C083239) (available for download at
https://pacificlegal.org/documents/ac-brief-environmental-law-fdn/).
36. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 151–
52 (1971).
37. Grace Heusner, Allison Sloto & Joshua Ulan Galperin, Defining and Closing the
Hydraulic Fracturing Governance Gap, 95 DENV. L. REV. 191, 196 (2017).
38. FRANKLIN L. KURY, CLEAN POLITICS, CLEAN STREAMS: A LEGISLATIVE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND REFLECTIONS 74 (2011).
39. Id.
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member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Kury thought he
could try something similar here in Pennsylvania. Rather than struggle over
a detailed, geography-specific inventory, however, he would craft, in
simple prose, an amendment to Pennsylvania’s Constitution putting forward
two powerful concepts.40 What he wanted to forever enshrine in
Pennsylvania law was “an articulation of the public’s interest in the
environment” wrote Kury in 2011 “and the placement of the responsibility
on state government to serve as a trustee of the state’s natural resources.”41
Amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution require approval by a
majority of the House and Senate in two consecutive meetings of the
General Assembly and then approval of the people of Pennsylvania.42 This
is a series of five significant hurdles and in today’s politics its simply
impossible to imagine that Representative Kury’s proposed amendment
could succeed. But things are different today. On June 1, 1969, the
proposed amendment passed the state house unanimously, 190-0, and the
rest was easy.43 The proposal also passed the state Senate unanimously, and
in the following session of the General Assembly, the proposal again passed
both chambers without a single dissenter.44
The proposed constitutional amendment was put to the people on May
18, 1971.45 What is now known as the Pennsylvania Environmental Rights
Amendment (ERA), Article 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, was
approved by a 4-1 margin, with over 1 million Pennsylvanians voting to
enshrine environmental protection in the state’s constitution.46
In its entirety, the ERA reads:
The people have the right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.47

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
KURY, supra note 38.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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Shortly after the new ERA took effect, a group of students from Wilkes
College and several other citizens of the city of Wilkes-Barre tried to use
the Amendment as a shield against a new road that was going to invade a
neighborhood park.48
The students brought their argument to the courts, claiming that because
the park was a historic area the state’s constitution now prohibited the
Department of Transportation from destroying any part of it with a road.49
The court thought this was too absolutist an argument. The ERA “was
intended to allow the normal development of property in the
Commonwealth,” the court ruled in 1973, favoring “controlled development
of resources rather than no development.”50
Undergirding the ruling in this case, Payne v. Kassab, was that a literal
reading of the ERA was, to the court’s mind, unrealistic. The court felt that
application of the ERA to real-world cases must be “realistic and not
merely formalistic.”51 To guide future courts in making “realistic”
environmental decisions under the ERA, the court built a three-part test.
First courts should ask if the state complied with the laws. Second, did the
state make a reasonable effort to minimize environmental damage? And
third, courts would need to balance the environmental harm of a state action
against the benefits of that action.52 None of this analysis seemed imbedded
in the text of the ERA, but the court sought to adapt a flexible standard that
would allow for “normal development of property.”53
The ERA, it seemed after the Payne ruling, had a very short life and a
very minor impact. That state of affairs remained until hydraulic fracturing
took hold in Pennsylvania over a decade ago. According to John Dernbach,
a Professor at Weidner University Commonwealth Law School in
Harrisburg, a leading expert on the ERA, it was when “the Marcellus Shale
boom and economic recession happened—at the same time” that the ERA
had its revival.54
The first sign that things were about to change emerged in the nowfamous case of Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania.55 In 2012, the
48. Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
49. Id. at 93–94.
50. Id. at 94.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. John C. Dernbach, The Abandonment and Restoration of Pennsylvania’s
Constitutional Public Trust, 49 No. 2 ABA TRENDS 10, 11 (2017).
55. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
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Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act 13 which, among other things,
prohibited local town governments from regulating hydraulic fracturing
operations within their borders. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found
that Act 13 was unconstitutional but was divided over the exact reasoning. 56
One group of justices argued that the Act was unconstitutional because it
violated the ERA.57 This plurality of justices argued that the ERA requires
Pennsylvania to act as a trustee for the environment.58 By removing
authority over hydraulic fracturing from towns, and replacing that authority
with very thin environmental protections, the state, said this plurality, had
violated its duty.59
Because the Robinson Township decision did not represent the reasoning
of the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it was more guidance
than law. But that would soon change.
In 1945, Pennsylvania began a program of leasing a small amount of
state land for oil and gas exploration.60 As part of that endeavor, the state
created the oil and gas Lease Fund to house income from the program. 61
Money in the Lease Fund could only be used for conservation and other
natural resource purposes.62
This is where the recession and the shale boom come in. Pennsylvania
found itself in a difficult financial situation just as hydraulic fracturing was
promising to make major inroads in the state. This was an opportunity that
was too good to pass up. “The state expanded drilling on state lands,
bringing in hundreds of millions of dollars” Dernbach explained. According
to the 1947 Lease Fund law, that money should have been used for
conservation or natural resource management but, says Dernbach, instead
the state “transferred much of that money to the General Fund to help
balance the budget.”63
The General Assembly had created the Lease Fund and the spending
restriction was really meant to restrain bureaucrats. On first blush, there
was no reason the General Assembly could not later decide to redirect

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 913.
Id.
Id. at 985.
Id.
Dernbach, supra note 54.
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 911, 919.
Id.
Dernbach, supra note 54, at 11.
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money out of the Fund for purposes other than conservation.64 Or that was
the thinking until the Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation got
involved.
The Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation is a tiny non-profit
organization. Its website scrolls downward endlessly, a mishmash of fonts,
typefaces, and colors looks like it may have been designed in the 1990s.65
According to Pennsylvania’s Department of State, the Foundation’s net
assets amount to less than $27,000.66 But the Foundation punches above its
weight, which turned out to be a problem for those who wanted the fracking
money for the state’s general fund and wanted to keep the ERA off the
radar. The Foundation challenged the General Assembly’s redirection of the
Lease Fund money, claiming that the ERA did not allow the diversion.
On June 20, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth (PEDF), agreeing with the Foundation and dramatically
reviving the ERA.67
The legislative process of managing state finances can be a slog and a
significant portion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in PEDF
relates legislative details taking place over several years.68 What stands out
about the court’s decision here are not these details, but two critical
decisions they arrived at only after they waded through the legislative
machinations. First, the Supreme Court explicitly decided to throw out the
1973 rule from Payne v. Kassab that had for decades suffocated the ERA.69
Second, in place of the Payne rule, the court insisted that the text of the
ERA should control and that Pennsylvania trust law is the best tool for
understanding the ERA.70
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the ERA created a trust. The
body of that trust is the public natural resources of the state. The state of

64. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 911, 927 (“It further highlighted that the
Lease Fund is not a constitutional creation but rather is a special fund created by legislative
enactment, which could be altered by subsequent legislative action.”).
65. PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, http://www.pedf.org/, (last
visited Sept. 6, 2018).
66. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE CHARITIES ONLINE DATABASE,
http://www.charities.pa.gov/CharityDetail.aspx?315id2e%3d122a1, (last visited Sept. 6,
2018).
67. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 911.
68. Id. at 919–25.
69. Id. at 930.
70. Id.
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Pennsylvania is the trustee. The beneficiaries of the trust are the people of
the state, including future generations.71
Pennsylvania trust law imposes three specific duties. The duty of
prudence means the trustee must exercise care in managing the trust.72 The
duty of loyalty means the trustee must manage the trust only for the benefit
of the trustees.73 The duty of impartiality means the trustee must consider
the needs of all the various beneficiaries,74 which includes those now alive
and future generations.75
Using these principles of trust law, the court here decided that the state
had indeed violated the ERA. Natural resources such as oil and gas, the
court explained, are part of the trust. When the state decides to sell these
resources, it gets, for instance, monthly royalty payments based on how
much oil or gas is produced. These proceeds, according to Christine
Donahue, the justice who wrote the opinion in PEDF, “are unequivocally
proceeds from the sale of oil and gas resources.”76 Therefore, “[t]hey are
part of the corpus of the trust and the Commonwealth must manage them
pursuant to its duties as trustee.”77
PEDF has not had almost a century of time to make waves, as Mahon
has, but it is nevertheless, not without its champions and critics. Some, like
Jim Willis, the editor and publisher of Marcellus Drilling News, declared
that “radical environmentalists are causing chaos and confusion” in their
use of the “Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a weapon” against drilling here
in Pennsylvania.78 Others are taking a more nuanced tact. Attorneys Jordan
Yeager, Laurel Williams, and Joseph Minott, representing a group of
environmental clients, have argued that PEDF changes the way the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection should conduct
itself when making decisions on whether to permit new natural gas wells. 79
71. Id. at 931–32.
72. Id. at 932.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Dernbach, supra note 54, at 12.
76. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 935.
77. Id.
78. Jim Willis, Fractivists Use Pennsylvania Supreme Court As Weapon, NATURAL GAS
NOW (June 25, 2017), http://naturalgasnow.org/fractivists-use-pennsylvania-supreme-courtweapon/.
79. Appellants’ Supplemental Post-Hearing Brief Regarding Article I, Section 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution at 1, 19, Del. Riverkeeper v. Commonwealth, (Aug. 21, 2017)
(EHB Docket No. 2014-142-B) (available at http://ehb.courtapps.com/efile/document
Viewer.php?documentID=38769).
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In order to fulfill their duties as trustees, argue the lawyers, the permit
writers need to be convinced that the potentially damaging activity will not
degrade the local environment.80
This is a major change from the status quo. It’s about precaution, Yeager
explained when we spoke last winter. In the past, there was a presumption
in favor of permitting but now, he thought, there may be a presumption
against permits, placing the burden on the applicant to justify that their
application is the result of science-based decisionmaking. And, Yeager
hoped, over time this can shift agency culture.81
***
Mahon has become an icon of conservative and legal advocacy and
PEDF may, within Pennsylvania and as a model elsewhere, become an
equally important icon for environmentalists and progressive advocates.
But as I read these cases, and read about them, and talk to people who have
a stake in the law they present, I am struck by how their outcomes are so
ideologically different from the judicial philosophies that they display.
Mahon, as it turns out, is an expression of progressive judging sometimes
called realism or pragmatism, while PEDF is an embodiment of
conservative formalism.
Justice Holmes, the author of Mahon, is famous for his embrace of realist
judging, advancing flexible judicial analysis that empowers judges to inject
subjective values into decisionmaking.82 Justice Donahue of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the author of PEDF, is lucky enough to not
(yet, at least,) be a pawn in any high-profile ideological tug-of-war. Thus, to
demonstrate the ideological underpinnings in PEDF I will instead portrait
the late Justice Scalia as the embodiment of formalism. Justice Scalia was a
lion of judicial conservatism, a champion of what he saw as judicial
restraint, which he advanced through formalistic, categorical rules that
might be more objectively applied.83

80. Id.
81. Interview with Jordan Yeager, Partner, Curtin & Heefner, in New Haven, Ct.,
Feb 26, 2018.
82. E.g., Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 788,
793 (1988).
83. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OR INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997).
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In United States v. Mead Corporation,84 an administrative law case about
when to grant deference to agency interpretations of law, Justice Breyer
made a brief statement that nicely summarizes these competing ideas.
Justice Scalia had dissented in that case, arguing for a categorical rule
rather than the more ad hoc approach the majority took. In response to
Scalia’s dissent, Breyer wrote “Justice Scalia’s first priority over the years
has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s choice has been to tailor
deference to variety.”85
This hits it right on the nose. Scalia believed that the role of the judiciary
is a classical one: to make the law simple and consistent, and then to place a
given factual situation into one simple bucket or another. This does not
leave as much space for case-by-case considerations of justice and equity,
but it does have the benefit of greater certainty and it makes it harder for
judges to apply their own preferences in decisionmaking.86
In Mead, the Court was taking an ad hoc approach. This is an approach
more indicative of progressive judging, the type of jurisprudence that
Justice Holmes preferred, in which judges can look carefully at the facts of
any given case and eschew categorical rule instead employing balancing
tests and perceptions of reasonableness. That approach may result in a
higher rate of decisions that seem fair, but it also permits judges to decide
what is and is not fair based on their own belief system, which is not easily
replicable.
Of course, while conservative formalism promises consistency and
progressive pragmatism promises fairness, these promises do not always
come to fruition in practice. Nevertheless.
This expectation of progressive jurisprudence embracing ad hoc
balancing and fact-based justice or classically conservative jurisprudence
holding tenaciously to categorical and formal approaches maps perfectly
onto Mahon and PEDF, respectively.
In Mahon the United States Supreme Court delivered an outcome that
pleased (and continues to please) conservatives and yet, the analysis
promotes Justice Holmes’ subjective balancing and flexible assessments of
rationality and effectiveness. Mahon employed a vague standard of “too
84. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
85. Id. at 236.
86. Stephanos Bibas, Justice Scalia’s Originalism and Formalism: The Rule of Criminal
Law as a Law of Rules 5 (2016), in The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia: Remembering a
Conservative Legal Titan’s Impact on the Law, Heritage Foundation, special report No. 186
(Aug. 30, 2016) (available for download at https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/thelegacy-justice-antonin-scalia-remembering-conservative-legal-titans-impact-the).
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far” and then compared the benefit of the regulation to the burden on an
individual property owner to determine that the Kohler Act did indeed go
too far.87 This balancing against an equivocal standard allows a judge to
inject his own conception of what is best, what is needed, what is
appropriate and it is exactly what we should expect from Holmes. As
William Treanor, a leading Mahon scholar and Dean of the law school at
Georgetown says, “Holmes rejected the categorical approach” and, Treanor
continues, he “favored balancing.”88
PEDF, as I discovered after a second and third reading of the case, is
really a very formal opinion despite its progressive outcome. In PEDF, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did two important things. First, it overruled
the law of Payne, the case the students brought to stop a road from
encroaching on a local park.89 Payne was explicitly a flexible, pragmatic,
decision that meant to give judges flexibility through its three-part
balancing test.90 In overruling Payne, the PEDF court was clearing away
judicial subjectivity, and they replaced it with the restraint of formalism
because the second important thing that PEDF did was to create a very
clearly defined, replicable, and categorical rule by using trust principles.91
In applying the trust doctrine, the Court did not invent any new law, or
even look closely at the nuance and justification for the General
Assembly’s diversion of hydraulic fracturing-based income. Instead, the
Court took a well-established body of law and applied it simply to the facts
at hand.92 This is the classically conservative judicial model of Justice
Scalia. As applied, the trust rules ask first if the property at issue falls into
the trust category and then if the government activity violates any of the
trust duties long enshrined in Pennsylvania law. This is not about judicial
policymaking; it is about judicial restraint.
***
Moving to Pennsylvania has brought some changes. There are old coal
mines roughly a half mile from my home and shale off-gassing immediately
below it. But there is also an Environmental Rights Amendment in the
state’s constitution. These sorts of contradictions seem to be popping up
everywhere here, and not least in state politics. You may have heard that
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Treanor, supra note 27, at 840.
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 930.
Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 930.
Id. at 932–40.
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Pennsylvania is a political swing state. Pittsburgh is a blue island of “I’m
With Her stickers,” in a bright red sea of MAGA hats.93 Who would have
thought that a United States Supreme Court case from 1922 about coal
mining and a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case nominally about state
finances but practically about hydraulic fracturing would have turned up
another set of contradictions?
There may not be any great revelation here, just an example of another
Northeasterner moving from one bubble to another. But as I settle into my
new home, I am also settling into teaching a new crop of students that
probably reflect the same political contradictions everywhere around me. If
nothing else, I hope that what I’ve learned from Mahon and PEDF can help
them consider their own commitments both political and in the law.

93. Pennsylvania Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017, 3:24 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/pennsylvania.
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